A truly sophisticated comparative cross-Atlantic field of study of immigration has been a long time coming (see Favell 2015: 69-122) . Despite a few early manifestos (Massey 1998 et al; Portes and De Wind 2004) and intimationsÑby the few European scholars who have put in serious time on both side of the oceanÑthat such an agenda might prove to be a little more complicated than expected (Joppke 1999 , Favell 2001 , Simon 2005 , Crul 2016 , it has taken American immigration scholars a long time to really start thinking hard about how to do adequate cross-Atlantic comparative work on Òimmigrant integrationÓ. That agenda is not yet fulfilled; and, as I will argue, Richard Alba and Nancy FonerÕs Strangers No More may prove to be a step backwards in some respects.
Prior to its publication, there was already a growing list of incursions into Europe by all the leading North American sociologists of immigration, using new data sources to look at Europe in AmericaÕs mirror. The core weakness of this research has been to pursue comparativism using what I will call essentially ÒflatÓ comparative research designs and analysis: that is, looking at, say, France or the UK, as if they were the US or Canada, and assuming that we can compare societies in North America and Europe as directly symettric, bounded and distinct nation-state units, regardless of scale, population, and international geo-political positioning (notably, the institutional reality of European Union). I have long argued that these ambitious but flawed works should be read against the grain for the instructive comparative problems they raise, rather than for their usually straightforward findings and well-intentioned normative motivations (other than work Alba has been involved in, a sample would also include: Parsons and Smeeding 2006 , Portes and De Wind 2007 , Hochschild and Mollenkopf 2009 , Hochschild et al 2013 , Portes et al 2010  for related critiques to mine, see Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2002, Brubaker 2004; Wimmer 2013; Waldinger 2015) .
Whatever the problems, Alba and Foner deserve warm recognition for their uniquely long standing and persistent commitment to developing this agenda. In parallel to the appearance of his magisterial work with Victor Nee on the US (2003), Alba was from the late 1990s already in deep dialogue with French and German partners about crossAtlantic work. Notably, the early article on blurring the color line (2005), although rough its its conclusions, has certainly provided a useful analytic. Nancy FonerÕs engagements go back even earlier: to doctoral work on Jamaicans in the UK (1978) . And, although most of her career has been focused on urban studies in American cities, she has a long grounding in comparative historical work on immigration (Foner 2005) : she has been, for instance, central to a recent spate of work comparing New York and Amsterdam (Foner, Rath et al 2014) . All in all, including other work with Alba as first listed author, we now have now a brace of articles (i.e., Alba and Foner 2008; , edited books (Alba and Waters 2011; Alba and Holdaway 2013) , a recent piece in JEMS (Alba and Foner 2016) , and now, as a culmination, a major monograph with Foner.
Strangers is a sweeping, longue durŽe work, that seeks to generalise about the broad historical pattern of post World War II change incurred in societies of immigration, comparing two North American societies (the US, Canada) with four European (Germany, France, The Netherlands, The UK). It is a synthetic work, building its conclusions across a range of typical issues to do with what it here opts to call Òimmigrant integrationÓ rather than ÒassimilationÓ (on labour markets, housing, religion, political participation, education, intermarriage), from a fairly exhaustive, yet selective, reading of the Òbest ofÓ current research, and the ÒbestÓ available secondary cross-national data. And, in encompassing many other authorsÕ efforts, the book goes further than any other work in the field in proscribing and operationalising a flat, straightforwardly cross-national terrain for such comparative work.
As long as it is clear ÒwhoÓ are the ÒimmigrantsÓ in the book, the approach taken here may not be controversial. Yet, while this term is often taken as self-evident in the US and Canada Ð an ÒimmigrantÓ is a newly arrived, putative American or Canadian Ð in Europe, it has become hugely complicated as a result of distinctions between old and new migrations, transnational, temporary and circular migration patterns, and changing trends in types and origins of migration. In Europe, what seems self-evident, in fact is not. Mostly, Alba and Foner delimit the data and interpretions they have in the light of major ÒimmigrantÓ groupsÑfor which we should read Òeasily visible, non-Western, immigrant-origin populations of colour and low socio-economic status and of long standing residence in the WestÓ (i.e., predominantly those with a second generation); amongst which are explicitly mentioned, especially, Turks and Morrocans in mainland Europe, (other) North Africans (in France), West Indians and South Asians (in Britain), and a few other archetypal Òpost-colonialÓ migrant groups in the four countries.
These groups Ð and not posted Polish construction workers, Chinese students, Phillipino nurses, or homeless Roma Ð have often been what the general public and newspapers have in mind when they complain about ÒimmigrantsÓ, and they are indeed a large part of the population change driving European politics and society. Much of what Alba and Foner call the Òdemographic transition to diversityÓ can indeed be said to be largely uncontroversial among immigration and race/ethnicity scholars in Europe. As long as the discussion is clearly delimited to those we can easily denominate (albeit controversially) as ÒimmigrantsÓ in the post-war era, we can generally agree on the findings. What the data shows in this sense, is something already well noted in Heath and associateÕs work (i.e., Heath and Cheung 2007): that there is an Òethnic penaltyÓ which these so-called ÒimmigrantÓ groups continue to face long after they are still ÒimmigrantsÓ. To keep it simple, we might as well just call this penalty Òracial discriminationÓ. Heath and CheungÕs important work also amalgamated its uneven population data from different countries, with their sharply different ways of counting migrants, foreigners, minorities, people of colour, and so on, in order to come to general conclusions valid across a range of OECD countries. Notably though, they used this quite clumsy synthetic method to sustain a basically different conclusion: that ethno-racial differences persist net of the Òimmigrant-originÓ variable. Alba and FonerÕs book (on my reading at least) suggests something else: that ethno-racial distinctions in Europe persist because of the immigrant origin of these groups. This is a hugely important difference. Although Alba and Foner quite carefully avoid stating it so plainly, I would argue it is the logic of their insistent view in the book that long standing ethnic minorities with full citizenship are still, analytically speaking, ÒimmigrantsÓ whose comparative ÒintegrationÓ can be analysed as a one-way, albeit problematic, progression towards a national mainstream. In the US and Canada, this is indeed a taken for granted notion. But in Europe, it is not so easy. In some cases, the European citizens we may be talking about are ÒimmigrantsÓ and their families who have been, legally and sociologically, (i.e.) ÒBritishÓ, for over sixty years now. In other words, according to Alba and Foner it seems, Black British youth being picked on by the police after the riots in 2011 are still being picked on because their grandparents were ÒimmigrantsÓ Ð not because they are ÒBlackÓ.
In the UK, this kind of claim is, to say the least, utterly incendiary. In fact, it is likely to get you banned from most race and ethnicity seminars! To prove it, unfortunately, would require a research design that is not at all offered here: one that was able to separate out from the ÒraceÓ variable(s) causing persistent discrimination or variations in outcome, others possible explanans such as: migrant-origin, nationality, citizenship (not always the same thing), non-migrant ethnicity (for example, visible regional minority origin), or (non-immigrant) mobility histories and trajectories, all controlled for other standard variables. Many of these would further require unpacking of the variable of ÒcultureÓ. Foner, especially, is concerned with religion Ð especially Islam Ð but this too is attributed to all ÒMuslimsÓ as if it was an ethno-racial marker of their ÒimmigrantÓ status.
All these variables, bluntly put, are effectively amalgamated into Alba and FonerÕs Òimmigrant-originÓ category in order to sustain their flattening of European cases into the American immigration mirror. That seems to be a consequence of turning everything into a problem of Òimmigrant integrationÓ. Again, to be fair, in some of their work (for example, the recent article in JEMS 2016), they are careful to underline that the ÒintegrationÓ of immigrants, seen as progressing in their American data, is only likely to ÒbridgeÓ ÒsomeÓ of the Òethno-racialÓ divides found in Europe. In her separate work on Islamic immigrants in cross-Atlantic perspective, Foner argues that ethno-racial discrimination of Muslims in Europe, may start to resemble the American scar of race (i.e. against African Americans) in its persistence (Foner 2015) . In these more nuanced works they underline, more strongly than in the book, the idea that what we are talking about is a Òtransition to diversityÓ, thus calling up the work of Vertovec, Crul et al (Vertovec 2007; Crul et al 2013) on Òsuper-diversityÓ. In Strangers, though, most of the substantive chapters use only data pertaining to the visible racialised minorities of (more or less) longstanding immigrant origin, as defined above. Elsewhere, in the opening chapters and conclusions, though, there is a serious slippage into generalisations that miss the whole point of Òsuper-diversityÓ: that this is a product of ÒnewÓ migrations (both new origins and new types) not at all in the post-colonial mould; that it is most evident in the UK; and that it raises the possibility of (im)migrant social identities, mobilities, and trajectories nothing like the one-way ÒintegrationÓ of ÒoldÓ (and still crudely ÒvisibleÓ) postcolonial migrants.
Thus, at the same time as it is too narrowing in some places of the diversity of recent migration, in others the book inconsistently pursues a maximalist quantitative strategy in terms of counting who is an ÒimmigrantÓ to be ÒintegratedÓ. Perhaps to stress the drama of the transition, the earlier chapters of Strangers in fact make a series of inflationary amalgamations of Òmigrant populationsÓ, strangely reminiscent of the dubious numbers games of the leading anti-migration demographer in the UK, David Coleman. These generate a huge percentage of ÒimmigrantsÓ and (particularly) Òimmigrant-originÓ children in some European countries. This amounts to 25% of all children (in Germany), they say, and 16% in the UK, on some measures. Then they claim that one in four children is born to an Òimmigrant motherÓ. But are these parents really all ÒimmigrantsÓ? The UK Office of National Statistics has produced this figure by counting births to Ònon-nationalsÓ as ÒBritishÓ babies. There are thought to be about 3 million EU nationals currently living and working as European citizens in the UK, but it is highly questionable as to whether any of them should be labelled ÒimmigrantsÓ (political speaking they may be, but legally speaking they are not). In later chapters, the authors generate similarly startling results from the UK by another route: using self-declared race and ethnic identification data as a proxy for immigrant origin, falling into the Òall non-whites are immigrantsÓ fallacy.
My point here is not to do alternate positivist gynastics with statistics. By selectively quoting different secondary sources, without out any context-giving background to the way research terms and numbers have been constructed, or the political pressure from which such statistics emerge, I am sure we could arrive at any number of quantitative conclusionsÑas does Coleman, who has famously claimed over half the British population will be Ònon-whiteÓ by the year 2050. Basically, though, one can only get these kinds of conceptions of the UK population by Òdouble countingÓ place of birth and ethnic identification statistics, essentialising ÒraceÓ, and by treating many of the major sending migrants groups to the UK as if they were all also still typical Ònon-WesternÓ, racially-distinct immigrants entering a pre-exisiting (all white) British population. But they are not. The authors are clearly more assured in their readings of France, Germany and the Netherlands; although there are doubtless issues here too to raise. For example, it is by no means clear to me that it is still advisable or acceptable to describe second and third generation North Africans as ÒimmigrŽsÓ; a residual label mostly only used by the Front National. At the same time, others who have constructed samples of immigrant-origin French going back three generations can easily push get the percentage of Òimmigrant originÓ French up to about 40% (Brouard and Tiberj 2005) Ñmuch higher than the UK even on the most exaggerated measures.
In the UK, significant proportions of the so-called ÒimmigrantsÓ are now often ÒwhiteÓ, skilled or educated, and from high or middling income countries. Even when Ònon-whiteÓ (on Alba and FonerÕs definition this means Ònon-EUÓ and from Africa, Asia, the Caribbean or Latin America), many of these recent residents are socioeconomically relatively advantaged compared to many in the countries from which they travelled. This was, in fact, even the case for many of the original middle class Windrush migrant families from Jamaica, or (another good example), South Asians who fled Africa. This multi-dimensionality is what super diversity is all about: a diversity largely invisible in Alba and FonerÕs old-fashioned post-colonial Europe.
On other aspects of Alba and FonerÕs work, there is much that is basically sound in their positioning on cross-Atlantic debates. They quite rightly take aim at explanations of immigrant integration based on stylised national models. They also rightly challenge reductionism to political economy explanations based on Òworlds of capitalismÓ. Nor, as they say, is it all just globalisation and convergence: institutions, particularly in the informal economy and in education, can be shown to matter (an argument basically they owe to Kloosterman, van de Leun and Rath 1999, and Crul 2013, respectively) . On some points the US or Canada look progressive; on others, European nations have developed better ways of dealing with diversity.
Their big target generally, though, is the assumed asymettry between settler countries of immigration, and the old nation-states of Europe. That is, they say, that there is no reason why European post-war societies should not just be seen as settler societies of immigrationÑjust like the USA, in other words. On this issue, we must pause for thought. Their JEMS paper (2016) takes a slightly different line, by stressing there is still empirical asymettry between the relative success of the US and Europe, but that we have no reason to predict it will not be different in future. That is, the US is a successful assimilationist machine, more or less working according to its ideology, despite all the racism, inequalities, and savage labour market conditions; a society in which the immigrant dynamic produces substantial social attainment and social mobility for many (albeit not all), as well as the inklings of a truly post-racial society through racial intermarriage (albeit heavily patterned)Ñall something yet to be really seen in Europe.
This reading of the US is controversial and against the grain of radical race and immigration scholars; but its sober marshalling of the evidence does put its finger on what the US gets right. AlbaÕs legacy in the US has been to underline that we still need the term ÒassimilationÓ, if we are to analyse these facts. This makes the turn in their subsequent European work to ÒintegrationÓ highly perplexing. The optimistic framing of ÒintegrationÓ they make is an interesting concession to European political correctness; that talking about immigrant ÒintegrationÓ is preferable because it supposedly recognises a two way dynamic that assmiliation arguably masks. What they omit to say is that unlike assimilation models (which are simply blind to their patently methodological nationalist assumptions about the bounding unit of ÒsocietyÓ providing the aggregate norms), ÒintegrationÓ in Europe is fairly explicitly an exercise in self-conscious top-down nation-building. That is, ÒintegrationÓ sees supposedly self-contained European national societies coercing foreigners to behave more like protypically (moral, acculturated, patriotic) nationals in the name of some fictitious national unity. It is, in other words, the political denial of the consequences of globalisation on the 19th century idea of the bounded nation-state-society. In most West European societies this has meant been a curbing of freedom to be be culturally or morally distinctÑone of the reasons why Islam is such an issue; but it is also why free floating, but conspicuously white and Christian, Romanians or Poles, who seem to care little about British sovereignty, ÒbelongingÓ or, on the whole, becoming British citizens, elicit such hostility.
Read generously, Alba and Foner are making a sensible and reasonable claim: that the national integration of certain disadvantaged migrants will mitigate the effects of racial discimination over time; and that, in a reasonable historical reading, countries like the UK and France did indeed make slow progress towards becoming better integrated multi-racial, multi-cultural national societies, with significant immigrant origin diversity, in the decades before the 1990s (that is, when looking at how the second and third generations today seem, retrospectively, to have done).
Clearly, though, Alba and Foner at times want to go further, citing Òsuper-diversityÓ, and overlaying the ÒoldÓ story on the ÒnewÓ. Britain, France, Germany, postglobalisation, are all now countries of immigration, and maybe even settler societies, they say. Here their comparative design, their data, and their flattening interpretations of migration in Europe, lead to significantly questionable conclusions. I have lingered on my differences more than my agreements, because this is an agenda which matters; and it is an agenda certainly that will lay the path for many older and younger North American scholars to come. Stubbornly ÒEuropeanÓ, and sceptical of the very idea of Ònational integrationÓ, I question the progressive wisdom of reconceiving a more ethnically diverse Europe-of-the-nations as the future mirror of the USA today.
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